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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
the lessor;"' the lessor cannot sue to recover any delay rental payments
nor can he sue for breach of contract.'2 An "or" lease does not terminate
automatically if there is no drilling as provided in the lease even if delay
rentals are not paid;' 3 rather the lessor has a cause of action against the
lessee to recover the amount of the delay rental.' 4
Therefore, relative to the distinction between an "unless" lease and
an "or" lease, there is a legal obligation to drill or pay only in the case
of an "or" lease; there is no legal obligation to drill or pay in an "unless"
lease such as was present in Long or Murphy. But relative to what is re-
quired to perpetuate a lease during the primary term, which was the un-
derlying problem in Long, the lessee is obligated to either drill or pay-
not both. If the lessee in Long had done neither, the lease would have
automatically terminated since it was an "unless" lease but the lessee would
have incurred no liability to the lessor; had it been an "or" lease and had
the lessee done neither, the lessee would have been liable for damages.
While the language of the court that "the lessee is obligated to either
commence the drilling of a well ... or pay to the lessor a... delay rental"
is inaccurate when applied to an "unless" lease, the context of the opinion
makes it dear that what the court really means is that the lessee, if it in-
tends to perpetuate its lease, must drill or pay.
Archie Robbins
CRIMINAL LAW: SEARCH AND SEIZURE-RIGHT OF PARENT TO
WAIVE CHILD'S IV AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
In the recent case of State v. Kinderman,' defendant, age twenty-two,
was convicted of armed robbery of a sum greater than $100. After his
arrest, police went to his home, where he lived with his father, and ob-
tained permission from his father to search the premises for evidence in
connection with the holdup. The police and the father went directly to
the son's bedroom where they found in the closer the gun, sunglasses, and
clothes used in the robbery. Defendant's motion to suppress this evidence,
obtained by search and seizure without a warrant, was denied. In affirm-
ing the trial court, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that while defend-
ant was protected from unreasonable searches and seizures under the
United States Constitution, Amendment IV,2 and the Minnesota Consti-
1 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Curtis, 182 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1950).
12 3 SUmMns, Om AND GAs § 452 (1958).
'3 Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177 P. 86, A.L.R. 352 (1918).
'4 SUMMRs, OIL AND GAS § 440 (1958).
1 136 N.W.2d 577 (Minn. 1965).
2 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized."
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tution, Article 1, S 10,3 his right of privacy in his father's home must be
considered from the standpoint of the father's right to waive it as sole
owner and one in possession. A vigorous dissent by the chief justice and
two associate justices argued that the search was unreasonable because the
father could not consent to a search without a warrant of the son's per-
sonal effects and that no reason was shown why the police did not obtain
a warrant.
In determining the legality of search and seizure without a war-
rant but with the consent of a third party, the courts have applied a test
of reasonableness.4 This test of reasonableness is resolved by looking at
the facts of each case.5 The courts have been especially concerned with the
relationship between the parties, the location of the evidence, and the
degree of control over this location by the one consenting.
In parent-child situations, the courts are as divergent in their results
as they are in their reasons. The early decisions looked merely at the con-
sent of the homeowner and were not particularly concerned with where
the evidence was found. Most illustrative of this view is Gray v. Common-
wealth. Although the evidence was found in the suspect's bedroom, the
court held that the consent of the householder enabled the police to make
the search.7
More recent decisions, while considering where the evidence is lo-
cated, have induced more confusion into this area of the law than they
have eliminated. In Holzhey v. United States," police were given consent
by the defendant's daughter and son-in-law, with whom the defendant
lived, to search their home. The court held this consent did not extend to
a locked cabinet containing the personal effects of the defendant, since
the police were put on notice by the daughter's statement that the cabinet
did not belong to herY
In Woodard v. United States,10 a lady let her grand-nephew and his
friend occupy a room in her apartment. While in the normal process of
cleaning their room, she discovered a pistol and some suspicious-looking
a The language of Artide 1. Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution is the
same as that of the United States Constitution, Amendment IV, supra note 2.
4 See, e.g., United States v. Zimmerman, 326 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1963);
United States v. Peisner, 311 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962); Buettner v. State, 233
Md. 235, 196 A.2d 465 (1964).
5 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1964); Fraker
v. United States, 294 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v. Law, 190 F.
Supp. 100 (S.D. Cal. 1960).6 198 Ky. 610, 249 S.W. 769 (1923).
7 Accord, Tomlinson v. State, 129 Fla. 658, 176 So. 543 (1937) (evidence
found in "front room" where defendant was sleeping); State v. Hagan, 47 Idaho
315, 274 P. 628 (1929) (evidence found in barn); Morris v. Commonwealth,
306 Ky. 349, 208 S.W. 2d 58 (1948) (evidence found in kitchen).8 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1955).
9 Contra, State v. Tuttle, 16 Utah 2d 288, 399 P.2d 580 (1965) (dictum).
Mother's consent to search a cabinet in her son's bedroom was upheld. While the
son normally lived at home, he was in the Air Force at the time of the search.10 254 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 930 (1958).
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papers and called the police. The court held her consent valid."
In Maxwell v. Stephens,1 2 a mother's consent was held to be sufficient
to authorize search of the closet in defendant's bedroom and seizure of his
coat hanging therein. The defendant shared the bedroom with two broth-
ers. It can be argued that by sharing the bedroom there was sufficient
common usage by the family to bring the case within the general rule
suggested by the court in United States v. Roberts.13
In Rees v. Peyton,1 4 the court held that the parent's consent was ade-
quate. The son lived in a distant city, occasionally stayed with his parents,
and was considered a guest. The evidence was found in a locked suitcase,
bearing the name, address, and telephone number of a third party, in a
crawl-way behind a closet in the attic. The parents did not know the
third party and had never seen the suitcase. The basis of the court's deci-
sion was that the defendant, being a guest, had no standing to object.16
In light of the Holzhey case, the evidence should have been excluded as
the police were put on notice that the suitcase belonged to a third party
and no attempt was made to contact that party before opening it.
The most recent case on parental consent is Reeves v. Warden, Mary-
land Penitentiary.10 Defendant lived with his mother, sister (who owned
the house), and niece. The mother was alone when police came to search
defendant's room and gave them permission. In summarizing the facts
and holding that the mother's consent was ineffective, the court said:
It was conceded by all that the room in which Reeves
was sleeping at the time of his arrest was his room and that
it was regularly and exclusively occupied by him. The dis-
rict court found as a fact that the bureau in which the note
11 Accord, People v. Galle, 153 Cal.App.2d 88, 314 P.2d 58 (Dist. Ct
App. 1957).
The Woodard case is distinguishable from the Holzbey case since in the
former it was customary for the lady to be in their room and they were consideredguests. Whereas, in the latter, the evidence was found in a locked cabinet set aside
for the exclusive use of the suspect.
12 229 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Ark. 1964).
13 223 F. Supp. 49, 59 (E.D. Ark. 1963) (dictum), cert. denied, 380 U.S
980 (1965):
"If a general rule must be extracted .... it may be said with some degree
of assurance that assuming a truly voluntary and understanding consent or authori.
ization the same is sufficient to validate a search if given by a person who is in
the sole possession or has sole control of the premises in question or who has an
equal right with the defendant or suspect to the possession or control of the
premises, provided that the search is limited to the general premises and does not
involve entry into portions of the premises obviously reserved to the exclusive uso
of the defendant or suspect .... ." (Emphasis added.)
Accord, United States ex rel. McKenna v. Meyers, 232 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa
1964).
14 341 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1965).
15 But see, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960) (defendant had
standing to object although he was at most an invitee or guest) : "Distinctions such
as those between 'lessee, 'licensee,' 'invitee' and 'guest,' often only of gossamer
strength, ought not to be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately refer-
able to constitutional safeguards:'
16 346 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1965).
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was found "was set aside exclusively for petitioner's use,
even though she (the mother) washed his clothes and
placed them in one of the drawers."
Even assuming, as the district court found, that the moth-
er's actions amounted to a grant of permission to enter and
search the premises, we think she was without authority
to consent to the search of Reeves' room and the bureau in
it by the officers and that the petitioner has standing to
challenge that search and the seizures which resulted from
it. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 265-266, 80 S. Ct.
725, 4 L. Ed.2d 697 (1960); Holzhey v. United States, 223
F.2d 823, 825-826 (5th Cir. 1955) .. .7
In the Kinderman case the majority bottomed the validity of the
search upon the father's control over the premises. The court asserted that
this control enabled the father to waive his son's constitutional right of
privacy and made the search reasonable. Insofar as those areas that the
father, as householder and one in possession, has sole control of or use
and enjoyment jointly with the son, the court was correct in relying upon
Roberts v. United States. 8But the court did not distinguish these areas
from those occupied exclusively by the son or even consider whether the
son's rights in his personal effects were superior to his father's rights
therein. The necessity of this distinction was shown by the dissent when
it looked to the Roberts case and commented, "IT]he court (in the Roberts
case) held the search was reasonable because, in contrast to the instant
case, 'the search did not extend to the personal effects of the appellant.,
332 F.2d 897."-19 Nowhere in the case was it shown that the father norm-
ally went into the son's room so as to make the Woodard case applicable.
Or that the father jointly used the room so as to come within the Roberts
case. While it may also be argued that there was no showing that the
defendant had that degree of exclusive use of his room which the de-
fendant had in the Reeves case, it would be more reasonable to assume
exclusiveness with a twenty-two year old defendant than to assume joint
use between him and his father. Furthermore, in allowing search of the
son's closet, the court must have believed that either the defendant's be-
longings therein were not his personal effects, or even if they were, the
father could consent to the search of them. The former belief would be
invalid since the articles were located in the closet of the son's bedroom.
The latter belief would be equally invalid in light of the Reeves case and
the Roberts case.
It appears that the majority was erronous in both its reasoning and
its conclusion. The court refused to follow the weight of modern authority
and look at where the evidence was found and the interests of the de-
fendant therein.20 Rather it chose the view of the early decisions and was
17 Id. at 924-25. (Emphasis by court.) (Footnote omitted.)18 332 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 980 (1965). See
general rule supra note 13.19 State v. Kinderman, supra note 1, at 585-86 (dissent). (Emphasis b7
court)
20 See text accompanying notes 8-17 supra.
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